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Abstract: Interest has been focused on the problem of enforcing compliance in 
collusive oligopolies by the suggestion that shifts in these incentive 
compatiblity constraints could explain the cyclical behaviour of inventories and 
of price-cost margins. This paper notes cross sectional implications of incentive 
compatibility constraints in asymmetric collusive oligopolies which may be 
useful in evaluating the prevalence of collusion or binding incentive 
compatibility constraints.
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Supergame theoretic models of collusive oligopolies have been 
proposed to explain important properties of the business cycle - procyclical 
inventories and countercyclical markups (Rotemberg and Saloner 1985, 
Rotemberg and Saloner 1986, Rotemberg and Saloner 1989, Rotemberg and 
Woodford 1989). Such results may even help explain the business cycle. 
The predictions of the theories on the cyclical behavior of inventories and 
markups are being tested. Unfortunately the tests cannot go far beyond 
documentation of the stylized facts to be explained in the first place. 
Furthermore, like all statistical tests they depend on auxiliary 
assumptions. It is clearly desirable to identify and test other implications 
of the theory.
The Nash supergame theoretic models of collusive oligopoly can 
also be tested because they make strong predictions about the behavior of 
firms of different sizes. Largely for reasons of tractability, existing models 
consider symmetric duopolies. While confining attention to duopolies, it 
is possible to discuss interesting applications of the theory for the behavior 
of duopolies consisting of one firm with a high capacity and one firm with 
a low capacity. I suggest that the implications are simple, the big firm does 
more than its share of the work of preventing competition and the little 
firm gets a relatively free ride at the expense of the big firm as well as of 
the consumer.
This has various implications given the various means that 
collusive oligopolists are alleged to enforce collusion. For different 
models the large firm will hold greater excess capacity, store large 
inventories and charge a slightly higher price for an identical good.
An extreme case illustrates this claim. Here as in the actual model I 
will assume that marginal cost is constant up to maximum capacity at 
which point it becomes infinite. In particular consider a collusive quantity 
setting duopoly which consists of a firm with very large capacity K and a 
firm with tiny capacity epsilon (e). As is standard I assume that firms agree 
on quantities to produce, then decide how much to actually produce, 
taking the other firms (correctly) expected output as given. Any retaliatory 
action takes place in later periods.
So long as total output is at least as great as the output which 
maximizes profits (which would be ridiculous) the large firm will gain 
little by increasing output even if the small firm has no ability to punish 




























































































ep to begin with so they can't fall much. This leaves virtually nothing to 
tempt even the most unscrupulous manager of the large firm. In other 
words, the large firm is virtually a monopolist to begin with so it needs 
little incentive to refrain from increasing output.
Slightly more formally, The large firm will certainly not produce 
more than a monopolist facing the same demand curve would. This 
means that it will increase output by no more than the agreed output of 
the small firm which is itself less than or equal to e. The increased profit 
obtained by increasing output to the static profit maximum is second order 
in the increase in output e.
In contrast, in the single period game, the small firm is almost 
competitive. Even if it produces to capacity it will have only a small effect 
on prices. Therefore its profits will increase first order in the increase in 
output. This increase must be small since the firms total capacity is small 
and so is its unused capacity. It is at least reasonable to suppose, as will be 
demonstrated more formally below the small firm will gain greater dollar 
profits from defecting unless it is producing at or very near capacity 
already. Otherwise its gains from defection will be greater in absolute (not 
just greater in proportion to its profits if it does not defect).
Abandoning all efforts to sneak a model into the introduction, I will 
only note that It is not easy for the large firm to impose large costs on the 
small firm which has small profits even when unpunished. In contrast 
even with a small ability to drive down prices, the small firm can impose 
appreciable costs on the large firm whose large output makes the dollar 
cost of a small drop in prices large. The implication of this argument is 
that the small firm will use almost all of its capacity even when 
cooperating.
The conclusion that the incentive compatibility constraint on the 
small firm is more difficult to satisfy has many interesting and testable 
implications. As argued above, large firms in collusive oligopolies in 
Nash equilibrium will leave a larger fraction of their capacity unused.
Similar logic implies that large firms will hold larger strategic 
inventories proportional to output. Since strategic inventories are 
difficult to distinguish from other inventories, this prediction can only be 
used to see if Nash-rational strategic inventories are a significant 
component of inventories.
More interestingly, if the incentive compatibility constraint is 
binding on the small firm(s) in an oligopoly, but not on the large firm(s), 
the large firm(s) will attempt to guarantee the sales of the small firms. 
This is difficult if firms can not anticipate demand perfectly and quite 
difficult if the large firm does not have access to all the information which 
is available to the small firm(s). One simple solution is for the large 




























































































consumers. This would imply price differentials even if the products of 
different firms are perfect substitutes. This prediction is very striking but 
not a firm implication of the model, since such behavior is especially 
likely to alert any regulators who are willing to pay attention.
This article is divided into seven sections the first of which is this 
introduction. The second discusses earlier work along similar lines. The 
third presents and develops a model of an asymmetric collusive duopoly 
producing a non-storable good with constant demand. The fourth 
discusses a durable good which is inventoried for strategic purposes and 
reports that larger firms will hold proportionally larger inventories. The 
fifth introduces uncertain demand and reports results on the benefit for 
the large firm of smoothing demand for the output of the smaller firm 
and therefore of charging a slightly higher price and letting the small firm 
ration consumers. The sixth discusses extensions of the results. The 
Seventh concludes and discusses proposed empirical tests of the 
predictions of the model.
II PREVIOUS WORK
In recent years economists have suggested that two long-standing 
empirical puzzles can be understood if covert perhaps implicit cartels are 
common and important.
The first puzzle is the apparent counter-cyclicality of the ratio of 
price to marginal cost. Estimates of this ratio for aggregate manufacturing 
are counter-cyclical (Bils 1987). It is particularly suggestive that estimates 
of the markup are more counter-cyclical for concentrated Industries than 
unconcentrated industries (Dommowitz, Hubbard and Petersen 1988). 
Furthermore it is necessary for markups to be counter-cyclical for a 
demand based explanation of the business cycle to be consistent with the 
observed pro-cyclicality of real wages (Bils 1985, Barsky and Solon 1985).
There are proposed explanations of counter-cyclical markups which 
do not refer to cartels (Dommowitz, Hubbard and Petersen 1986, Bils 1989). 
Nonetheless an explanation which has received intense attention depends 
on the suggestion that cartels find it more difficult to enforce compliance 
when the level of demand is high than when it js low (Rotemberg and 
Saloner 1986, Rotemberg and Woodford 1989).
The second puzzle is the positive correlation of inventories and 
sales or in other words the greater variance of output than of sales. There 
are many proposed explanations of this pattern. One explanation is that 
colluding firms hold strategic inventories and threaten to sell them in 
order to punish deviation from the collusive agreement. Again it is 
assumed that it is more difficult to enforce collusion when demand is 





























































































The possibility that models of cartels can explain patterns which are 
otherwise mysterious has caused a sharp increase of interest by non­
specialist economists in models of cartels. This in turn makes it more 
important to derive testable predictions about the behavior of cartels. In 
particular the models discussed above rely on the assumption that cartel 
behavior is determined by binding incentive compatibility constraints. 
This means that it is important to derive testable predictions about the 
behavior of cartels with binding incentive compatibility constraints. 
Earlier interest motivated by the effort to implement antitrust legislation 
did not focus on this question.
In this paper I propose that binding incentive compatibility 
constraints have clear implications for the behavior of asymmetric 
collusive duopolies. There has been relatively little work on asymmetric 
cartels, perhaps because theorists are not confident about how to solve 
cooperative games without appealing to symmetry. It is necessary to 
decide whether the results are sensitive to the particular bargaining 
solution used. Schmalensee analyses a model in which different members 
of a Cartel have different marginal costs which are constant for each firm 
(Schmalensee 1987). Osborne and Pitchik analyze a model still closer to 
the model which is the main focus of this paper. They assume that all 
firms have the same constant marginal cost but have different capacities 
(Osborne and Pitchik 1983). Neither article focusses the incentive 
compatibility constraint or asymmetries in the incentive compatibility 
constraint.
A separate literature on cartel stability considers incentives and 
asymmetric cartels (Donsimoni 1985, Donsimoni, Economides and 
Polimarchakis 1986,Martin 1990) literature is quite different from that 
which Rotemberg and Saloner and Rotemberg and Woodford use and 
extend. It addresses the same question but gives very different answers for 
two reasons: defection is assumed to be observable immediately and the 
game is assumed to be one shot (or finitely repeated) so punishment 
strategies are dynamically inconsistent. This implies that the conclusions 
concerning incentive compatibility are completely different and while 
they cast doubt on theories which appeal to collusion in explaining 
macroeconomic phenomenon they do not help one to draw testable 
predictions based on such theories.
In marked contrast to the relative absence of theoretical work, case 
studies of confessed cartels discuss asymmetries in the behavior of the 
member with the lowest cost (or largest capacity). The qualitative 
behavior of the members of the oligopoly is as proposed in this article: the 
largest producer bears a more than proportional share of the costs of 
enforcing collusion. It holds more than proportional excess capacity and 
serves as a swing producer absorbing more than its share of fluctuations in 
demand. In the most prominent case, OPEC, this pattern is familiar to 




























































































of ten other successful cartels (Eckbo 1976). To my knowledge empirical 
researchers have not developed theoretical models which might be used 
to determine whether the observation reflects peculiarities of the cases 
studied rather than a general rule which might be expected to apply to 
covert cartels.
The theoretical and empirical literatures do not correspond closely. 
Most theoretical papers consider symmetric cartels as do all theoretical 
applications of cartel theory to problems in macroeconomics. In contrast 
case studies of known cartels emphasize the importance of asymmetry. 
An analysis of the implications of asymmetry for cartel behavior might 
bring the two strands closer together.
Ill A SIMPLE MODEL
Consider two rational profit maximizing firms facing a linear 
inverse demand curve with fixed marginal cost up to a fixed maximum 
capacity. The inverse demand curve is given by equation 1
l)p  = a-b(q,+q2)
where p is price and qj is the quantity produced by firm i. For firm i 
marginal cost is equal to m a constant up to exogenous maximum capacity 
Kj( where K, < K2. The game is repeated indefinitely but the good is not 
storable. The firms agree on planned outputs s, and s2 at the beginning of 
each period t (time subscripts are suppressed on the promises for 
notational simplicity). Then they chose how much to actually produce 
given their (assumed to be correct) beliefs about the level of output being 
chosen by the other firm and the consequences of breaking their promises. 
After suitable apologies to Dilip Abreu (Abreu 1986, Fudenberg and 
Maskin 1986) assume that if any firm breaks its promise firms simply cease 
to collude and produce the static Cournot Nash equilibrium outputs 
(Friedman 1971,1983).
In period two, Firm i chooses qj to maximizes the discounted 
stream of profits
2) Vi = I  ( l/(l+ r))(t' lo)(a-b(qlt+q2t)-m)qjt 
t=to
where r is the rate of discount and qj( is the quantity produced by firm i in 
period t. qit clearly depends on whether any firm has cheated before time 
t.
since the problem is stationary sit = Sj the same for every t, and, 
since there is no uncertainty, no promises are broken in Nash 




























































































3) V, = ((l+r)/r)(a-b(s,+ s2)-m)Sj
where s, and s2 are determined by bargaining.
Each firm faces the temptation to choose the static profit 
maximizing level of output and then (by assumption) the Cournot Nash 
level of output and profits in all future periods. To determine the 
incentive compatibility constraint it is necessary to calculate the static 
profit maximizing level of output given the planned output of the other 
firm and to calculate the static Cournot-nash equilibrium. Firms i's profits 
under the Nash assumption that firm j firm keeps its promise is given by 
4
4) profitjt = (a-WSj+qjJ-mJqj
This gives profit maximizing output
5) qi( = (a - bsj -m)/2b
which firm i will produce if it has the capacity. This is greater than output 
in the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium and for simplicity is assumed to be 
greater than K,. So the firms are assumed to produce to capacity if they 
defect and obtain profit
6) profit;, = (a - b(Sj+Kj) - m)K, = (a - b(Sj+Sj) - b(Kj-Sj) - m)Kj
Unfortunately for the dishonest firm, it must settle for Cournot- 
Nash profits in subsequent periods. For simplicity assume that firms find 
it profitable to produce at full capacity in Nash equilibrium (and would 
produce more if they had the capacity). This has the added advantage of 
making it impossible for firms to punish each other more severely than by 
moving to the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium so I don't have to 
apologize to Abreu. There is little reason for a firm to produce capacity 
that it won't use even in the static Nash equilibrium (of course this 
argument should follow from a serious discussion of capacity choice). If so, 
the present value of the stream of profits of a defecting firm is given by 7
7) V) = (l/r)(a  - b(K,+K2) - m)K) + profit,,
which finally gives the incentive compatibility constraint for firm i
8) Sj 2 Kj|(a - b(sj+Sj) - b(Kj-Sj) - m) +
(a - b(K,+K2) - m)/r)/([a-b(s,+s2)-m](l+r)/r)
which holds so long as it uses its full capacity when it defects and both 




























































































Equation 8 implies that if firm 1 has smaller capacity than firm 2 the 
incentive compatibility constraint binds when its output is a larger 
fraction of that capacity. The minimum incentive compatible value of 
s ,/K , differs from the minimum s2/K 2 only because of the term -b(K,-s,) 
in the numerator. This is the amount of unused capacity, not the fraction 
of capacity unused, so if s , /K ,  = s 2/ K 2 the incentive compatibility 
constraint on s, binds if the incentive compatibility constraint on s2 binds.
Comparison of the minimum s( given by the incentive 
compatibility constraint with the output which would be given by an 
enforceable cooperative solution is made simpler by restating the benefits 
and costs of defecting in terms of differences from the static Cournot- Nash 
equilibrium profits. A firm defects if the difference between its profits if it 
defects and its profits if it cooperates is greater than the present value of 
the difference between its profits in the cooperative solution and in the 
static Cournot-Nash equilibrium. That is if 9 holds
9) PD, - PC, <= (PCj - PN C j)(l+r)/r
where PDj is the maximum profit firm i can obtain if it defects from the 
cooperative solution, PCj is the profits it obtains each period under the 
cooperative solution and PNCj is the profits it obtains each period in the 
static Cournot-Nash equilibrium. PDj-PCj can be calculated for the simple 
linear inverse demand function from the first derivative of profits with 
respect to qj at q( = Sj which is given by 10.
10) dProfitj/dqj = (a - b(2Sj+Sj) - m)
Note that the derivative is larger for firm 1 than firm 2 if s, is less than s2. 
The second derivative of profits with respect to qf is simply -2b for the 
linear inverse demand function. Even for more general inverse demand 
functions it is the same for both firms. This means that if neither firm 
produces at capacity when defecting, PD, - PC, is greater than PD2 - PC2 if s, 
is less than s2.
Even if firm 1 produces at capacity when it defects, it gains more 
from defecting than firm 2 if s, is sufficiently smaller than s2 so that 11 
holds
11) (a - b(2s,+s2) - mXKj-s,) - (K,-s,)2b >
(a - b(2s2+s,) - m)(K2- s2) - (K2- s2)2b
This condition will hold in any cooperative equilibrium. The 
reason is that there is no reason for a collusive oligopoly to produce less 




























































































temptation to defect but certainly won't produce less. This means that an 
increase in output reduces total profits or in other "words"
12) (a-b(2s,+2s2)-m) < 0
This means that if s, is less than s2 and if inequality 13 holds then 
inequality 11 holds and the gain to firm 1 from defecting is definitely 
greater than the gain to firm 2.
13) s2(K,-s,) - (Kr s,)2 > s , ( K 2- s 2) - (Kj- s2)2
If Sj were proportional to Kj the smaller firm would gain more form 
defecting than the large firm since the first terms in the sums would be 
equal and the second term would be further below zero for the large firm. 
In contrast, the difference between profits under the cooperative and 
Cournot-Nash equilibria would be greater for the large firm, since such 
costs are proportional to capacity. This means that only the incentive 
compatibility constraint of the small firm could bind. This virtually rules 
out output proportional to capacity unless neither constraint binds in 
equilibrium (in which case supergame theoretic models have no 
interesting implications).
Except for the amazing coincidence of the constraint just binding 
when the firms share the monopolists output proportionally, binding 
incentive constraints imply that the larger firms uses a smaller fraction of 
its capacity in equilibrium. If incentive compatibility constraints affect the 
equilibrium at all they will cause the large firm to use a smaller share of its 
capacity in equilibrium.
This argument is quite general and does not depend on the linearity 
of the inverse demand function. For a more general inverse demand 
function b would be replaced by different constants for the collusive price 
and the derivative of the inverse demand function at the collusive output 
to obtain the derivative of profit with respect to output at s(. In the 
squared terms 2b would be replaced by the second derivative at some point 
between s( and K( to apply the mean value theorem and calculate the gain 
from deviating. The inequality would still hold.
The argument remains valid if marginal costs are increasing on the 
reasonable assumption that marginal cost depends on the fraction of 
capacity in use. In general if the large firm maximizes profits by increasing 
production by x% when it defects, the smaller firm can obtain a larger 
benefit from defecting if it increases production by x% and still higher 
profits if it increases production by the optimal amount.
This implies that if any incentive compatibility constraints are 




























































































small firm. Unfortunately this prediction is difficult to test, since it is 
difficult to measure capacity.
It does suggest that the return on capital should be smaller for the 
large firm than for the small firm. This prediction is not firm, since it is 
possible that large firms benefit from efficiencies of scale.
Beyond description of the incentive compatibility constraints, 
analysis of the incentive compatible cooperative equilibrium requires 
discussion of cooperative theories and bargaining. The remainder of the 
paper largely discusses the question of which incentive compatibility 
constraints bind at the cooperative equilibrium which would be achieved 
if bargains could be legally enforced. I conclude that, under any reasonable 
assumptions, the constraint on the small firm is tighter — that it certainly 
binds if the constraint on the large firm binds.
In any collusive equilibrium each firm must produce enough to 
satisfy 9 and 10. To say more one must turn to cooperative game theory 
e.g. the Nash bargaining solution in which the oligopoly agrees to 
maximize
14) (PC, - PNC,)X(PC2 - PNC2)
where PC, is the present value of profits received by firm i under the 
agreement, PNC, is the profits achieved by firm i without agreement and x 
is a weight reflecting bargaining strength. The firms will maximize 14 
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints described by equations 9 
and 10. PNC, is simply (a - b(K,+K2) - m)Kj(l+r)/r. x is more problematic. 
Equal weight, that is x = 1, is suggested by the original logic of Nash's 
argument and, still more, the non- cooperative interpretation of the 
solution provided by Rubenstein (1982). On the other hand intuition (and 
English) suggests that a large firm will have greater weight than a small 
firm and x will equal say K ,/K 2. I will confuse the following discussion by 
checking which results hold under both assumptions.
I will start with the assumption that x = K ,/K 2. It is clear that at the 
maximum of 14 (which may not be incentive compatible) each firm will 
produce output proportional to its capacity. This implies that if either 
incentive compatibility constraint constrains the bargain, it is the 
constraint on the capacity of the smaller firm.
Since firms can transfer profits by increasing the scheduled 
produciton of one firm and decreasing the scheduled production of the 
other, equal weight implies that the firms benefit equally from the 
collusive agreement. The effect of collusion is twofold -- the firms obtain 
a higher price and they produce less output. Let the collusive price be 





























































































15) PCj - PNCj = (pricec - pricen)(Kj) -(pricec - m)(Kj - Sj) = PCj - PNCj
This implies that in the cooperative equilibrium the difference in 
unused capacity is a fraction of the difference in capacity as described by 
equation 16
16) (K,-s,) - (K2- s2) = [K,-K2](pricec-pricen)/(pricec - m).
Which is equivalent to equation 17
' 17) (K,-s,) - (K2- s2) = [K,-K2]b(K,- s, + K2- s2 )/(pricec - m).
Equation 17 implies that the excess capacity of the smaller firm is less than 
the excess capacity of the larger firm (which is to say the least 
unsurprising). Equations 16 and 17 are implied by equal sharing of the 
gains from oligopoly. If a firm has an incentive to cheat when the 
oligopoly splits the gains evenly, the firms may agree to a lower price. The 
other firm may give the potential cheater a larger share of the profits or 
may agree to a higher output level but in any case will not give up more 
than it has to. This means that if an incentive compatibility constraint 
binds when gains are shared equally, it will bind with equality in the 
incentive compatible equilibrium. Equation 17 will be used without 
further apology.
Since each firm is assumed to benefit equally from collusion, each is 
punished equally severely for defection. The only difference between the 
two incentive compatibility constraints is the difference between the 
profits obtained by defection. Subtracting the second term of inequality 11 
from the first gives equation 18 which describes the difference between the 
gain from defection for firms 1 and 2.
18) dif = gainl - gain2 = (pricec - m - bSjXK, - s,) - (pricec - m - b s2)(K2 - s2)
- (K,-s,)2b + (K2-s 2)2b
A little algebraic manipulation gives
19) dif = (pricec - m - b(s, + s2))(K, - s, -(K2 - s2)) +
bK2(K, - s,) - bK,(k2 - s2) - (K,-s,+K2- s2)(K, - s, -(K2 - s ^ b
and
20) dif = (pricec - m - b(s, + s2)(K, - s, -(K2 - s2)) +
(K2 - K,)(K, - s, + K2 - + (s, + s2)[K, - s, -(K2 - s2)]b/2  -




























































































plugging equation 17 into equation 20 gives equation 21
21) dif = [K, - s, -(K2 - s2)]{pricec - m - b(K, + K2))/2
The term in square brackets, the difference in excess capacities is clearly 
negative as noted above. The term in braces is strictly less than the effect 
of an output on joint profits at the collusive equilibrium and must be 
negative. This means that the smaller firm is closer to its incentive 
compatibility constraint. If the constraint is violated at the joint profit 
maximum, the firms will have to settle for a lower price. This means that 
the large firm will be able to bargain for a division of profits in which the 
constraint of the small firm is binding and its own constraint is not. This 
situation has many interesting implications which will be explored in the 
next section.
First it is necessary to decide if the large firm finds this optimal or if 
it would prefer to accept less than half of the benefits of oligopoly in order 
to achieve a higher price. As noted above, the small firms incentive 
compatibility constraint can be satisfied by increasing both firms output 
and accepting a lower price or by keeping the price the same and giving it a 
larger share of the sales. It is clear that the large firm will not choose an 
outcome in which it gets less than half of the benefits form oligopoly. 
Consider small changes from the outcome in which gains are shared 
equally and the first firms constraint is binding. An increase in the price 
increases the small firm's incentive to defect, so the large firm would have 
to bear more than all of the costs of increasing the price. This clearly 
reduces its profits. This means that the large firm will choose an outcome 
in which the incentive compatibility constraint of the small firm is just 
binding and its own constraint is not binding.
The results with equal bargaining weights were derived for 
extremely simple and unrealistic assumptions about technology and 
demand. It is not clear (at least to me) if they generalize. Combined with 
the clear and general results for bargaining weights proportional to 
capacity they give a very strong presumption that in actual collusive 
duopolies the constraint on the small firm is more likely to be binding. 
The profits obtained by the duopoly depend on the amount of production 
it withholds from the market, so the large firm contributes more than the 
small firm. Larger firms are less likely to be liquidity constrained which 
increases their patience in bargaining and reduces their incentive to defect. 
Firms which produce a large fraction of the output of an industry (and 
which are dishonest to boot) are of course rare. Smaller firms are more 
numerous so each one is expendable. The large firm may be able to form a 
duopoly with a third firm. This advantage for the large firm could be lost 





























































































It is extremely unlikely that the smaller firm in a duopoly could 
bargain for half of the gains from restraint of trade. Therefore smaller 
firms are likely to gain more from defecting. Their incentive compatibility 
constraint is more likely to bind. If there is a duopoly and only one firm is 
indifferent between defecting and keeping its promise, it is probably the 
smaller firm.
This section has two conclusions; 1. if incentive compatibility 
constraints bind, the larger firm in a duopoly will use a smaller fraction of 
its capacity and probably receive a lower return on capital 2. if only one 
incentive compatibility constraint binds it will be the incentive 
compatibility constraint of the small firm.
IV INVENTORIES
Thus far 1 have only discussed duopolies which produce a non- 
storable good. When storage is possible firms may hold strategic 
inventories; inventories of the good which are liquidated if the other firm 
defects and which increase the severity of the "punishment" for defection. 
The arguments of section II suggest that the larger of the two firms will 
have a greater need for strategic inventories than the smaller firm, since 
in the cooperative equilibrium the incentive compatibility constraint of 
the smaller firm is tighter. In other words the difference between profits 
in the cooperative equilibrium and profits obtained by defecting is higher. 
In fact the larger firm needs a larger strategic inventory proportional to its 
sales than the smaller firm.
1 will assume that the cost of holding inventories I is equal to 
interest on the initial expenditure for inventories plus the cost of 
replacing depreciated inventory (r+5)ml. I assume that firms can observe 
production and inventdries, so the level of inventories can be negotiated 
and (possibly) enforced by the threat of returning to the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium. I will also assume that if a firm chooses to sell their 
inventory either because it is defecting or because the other firm has just 
defected, it will sell its entire inventory.
The sale of the inventory held by the other firm imposes an 
additional cost of defection. Inventories directly increase the profits of 
defection in two ways, the firm profits from the sale of the inventory and 
it saves the cost of replenishing depreciated inventory. In other words if 
firm 1 holds inventories 1, profits in the cooperative equilibrium are
reduced by 51 j each period. Its profit in the period in which it defects is 
increased. Its profits in the period after it defects is decreased by bI2K,. 
Note that, if inventories are proportional to capacity, the additional cost of 




























































































The additional profit obtained by firm i if it sells its inventory when 
it defects is given by equation 22
22) extra profit, = [a - bSj - 2bKj]I, - (I,2(b))
where the term in square brackets is the derivative of profits with respect 
to additional sales of a firm which is already selling all it produces, 1, is the 
inventory remaining to be sold and the term in braces is the loss due to 
the second derivative of profits with respect to sales (-2b).
According to the model of bargaining described above (with either 
or any weight on the profits of the two firms) the reduction in profits due 
to the cost of replacing depreciated inventories would be considered in 
negotiating the level of output allowed the two firms. This means that 
the difference between profits in the cooperative equilibrium (including 
the cost of replacing depreciated inventories) will be proportional to 
capacity if bargaining power is proportional to capacity and equal if 
bargaining power is equal. The cost of holding inventories is the sum of 
the cost of replacing depreciated inventories and interest on the original 
cost of building up inventories. The second term is a sunk cost. The 
present value of PC2 - PNC2 is greater than PC, - PNC, by m(I2-I,) in order 
to compensate the large firm for building up larger inventories. Since the 
model is stationary this is achieved by allowing the larger firm an 
additional r*m(l2-l,) of profits per period. So if the large firm has at least 
as much bargaining power as the small firm equation 23. holds
23) PC2 - PNC2 - (PC, -PNC,) i  rm(l2-I,)
This means that the cost of returning to the Coumot-Nash equilibrium is 
greater for the firm with larger inventories even if the firms have equal 
bargaining power and the price is joint profit maximizing.
Under the assumption of equal bargaining power, the difference in 
the incentive compatibility conditions is changed by the addition of the 
difference in the cost of the inventories the difference in the profits 
obtained by selling inventories and the subtraction of the cost imposed by 
the other firm when it sells its inventory as part of the punishment. This 
gives equation 24
24) dif £ + ml2 - ml, - bK,I2 + bK2I, + [a - b s2 - 2bK, JI, - l,2 (b) - 
[a - bs, - 2bKj]I2 + I22(b)
Equation 24 implies that the larger firm must hold more inventory 
in proportion to its sales than the smaller firm. In any case it is clear that 
the larger firm must hold a larger inventory than the smaller firm so the 





























































































25) dif > bK2I, - bK,I2 + |a - b s2 - 2bK, - m]I, -[a - bs, - 2bK2 - m]I2 
Inequality 12 implies that
26) dif > bK2I, - bK,I2 + b 83!, - 2b(K,-s,)I1 -bs,I2 + 2b(K2- s2)I2.
If inventories and sales are proportional to capacity this difference is 
positive implying that the small firm is holding more inventory than 
necessary to prevent defection or that the large firm is holding less 
inventory than necessary. In other words the large firm must hold more 
inventory proportional to its capacity (and sales) than the small firm.
If the large firm uses as smaller fraction of its capacity as it would if 
e.g. bargaining power were equal then it must hold larger inventory 
proportional to sales. If s2l, = s,l2 > 0 then inequality 26 becomes inequality 
27
27) dif/(s,I2) > (K2/  Sj ) -(K ,/S]) + (K2- Sj )/ Sj - (Kj-SjJ/s, > 0
That is if inventories are proportional to sales (and are not zero) either the 
small firm is holding a larger inventory than necessary or the large firm is 
holding a smaller inventory than necessary.
The supergame theoretic model of strategic inventories clearly 
implies that the larger firm in a duopoly will hold a larger inventory in 
proportion to sales than the smaller firm in the duopoly. It is reasonable 
to suppose that the same logic applies to oligopolies with more than two 
members. Furthermore it is very likely that only the largest firms in an 
industry will collude. Since it is difficult to enforce cooperation of small 
firms it is likely that large firms will allow them to free ride which would 
imply that small firms need not hold strategic inventories at all. The 
model suggests that large firms will hold greater inventories compared to 
sales than small firms in the same industry. This prediction can be tested 
for industries in which data on inventories held by firms are available e.g. 
the car industry.
V UNCERTAIN DEMAND
Would either firm in a collusive duopoly choose to act as the swing 
supplier insuring the other constant sales ? The results reported in the 
earlier section strongly suggest that if either firm would do so it would be 
the larger of the two. If the smaller firm is undecided whether to defect or 
keep its promise, the large firm would benefit by insuring its demand. 
One simple way to do this would be for the large firm to charge a slightly 




























































































If information about demand is symmetric, the agreed quantities 
can be made a function of expected demand. An automatic mechanism is 
only necessary if information is asymmetric.
One important form of asymmetric information is asymmetric 
information concerning future demand -- that is demand in periods after 
the one for which the firms are deciding which output to produce. This 
affects the current decision only because it affects the cost of the 
"punishment" for returning to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium from the 
negotiated equilibrium.
If the smaller firm knows that in expectation demand will be very 
low in second period while it is deciding what output to produce in the 
first period and the larger firm does not and will not learn before the 
second period, the smaller firm will break the collusive equilibrium. If 
the larger firm does not learn about the decline in demand before it 
decides how much to produce in the second period it will produce S2 if the 
smaller firm has not finked in the first period and K2 if the small firm has 
finked. If the small firm expects that demand will be very low in the 
second period then the anticipated cost of the drop in demand will be less 
if it has finked than if it has cooperated in the first period. For example if a 
is so low that a - bS2 - m < 0, then the smaller firm's profit will be zero in 
any case, so it will not lose profit in the second period by finking in the 
first. Even for demand higher than this very low level, the cost of 
returning to the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium will be reduced by the 
decline in demand. If incentive compatibility constraint of the smaller 
firm was binding even for normal a, it will violate the collusive 
agreement in period 1.
An anticipated decline in demand may also reduce the cost of 
defection of the larger firm, but as argued above, it is less likely for the 
incentive compatibility constraint of the larger firm to be binding.
To avoid the danger that anticipation of a sharp drop in demand in 
the future will cause the smaller firm to defect, the larger firm could 
guarantee that demand for the product of the smaller firm not fall too low 
by refusing to cut its price as much as the small firm if demand is very 
low. In this case the smaller firm will sell all that it produces, but the 
larger firm will inventory some of its product. Even if the carrying cost of 
inventories is so high that neither firm normally holds them, the larger 
firm will still hold inventories in periods of extremely low demand.
This argument requires the assumption that the larger firm will not 
learn about the imminent decline in output before it decides how much to 
produce in the second period. If it learns, and if the smaller firm has not 
violated the agreement in the first period, it will reduce output enough to 
keep the smaller firm from violating the agreement in the second period. 




























































































period than the smaller firm would have if there were no decline in 
demand.
It is however not necessary to assume that the smaller firm does not 
consider warning the larger firm about the decline in demand. If the 
larger firm granted the smaller firm a larger share of output when the 
smaller firm warned of an expected decline in demand, the smaller firm 
would have an incentive to lie. If its information is imperfect, it could not 
be caught with confidence.
For asymmetric information to cause the smaller firm to fink, it is 
not necessary for the specific form of asymmetric information described 
above to be the only form of asymmetric information. It is only necessary 
for it to exist.
The results described in this section are not very useful. The 
conditions required for the larger firm to benefit by refusing to cut prices as 
much as the smaller firm are extreme and might never occur. In any case, 
they are likely to be rare, making it difficult to observe such behavior. 
Furthermore it is impossible to know if price differences are the result of 
collusion or differences in quality. The section amounts more nearly to a 
suggestion to oligopolists about how they might better exploit consumers 
than a suggestion of how to test whether firms are colluding.
VI GENERALIZATIONS
The models used above all assume that both firms have equal 
marginal cost (at least as a function of capacity utilization). The 
conclusions are more general. Similar results obtain when the two firms 
each have constant marginal cost (and infinite capacity) and one firm has 
lower marginal cost than the other. Assume each firm agrees to reduce its 
output by the same fraction of its Coumot/Nash output. The incentive 
compatibility constraint of the less efficient firm is more difficult to satisfy. 
If it is just binding, the incentive compatibility constraint of the more 
efficient firm will not bind. If incentive compatibility constraints bind at 
all, the more efficient firm will have to reduce its output proportionally 
more than the less efficient firm.
This result directly leads to the conclusion that the incentive 
compatibility constraint of the more efficient firm does not bind in the 
Nash bargain collusive agreement. In the Nash bargain with equal 
weights, the more efficient firm reduces output proportionally less than 
the less efficient firm.
Similar results obtain if prices instead of quantities are the strategic 
variable. The outcome without collusion and the benefits of deviation are 
very different of course. Nonetheless, in an incentive compatible 




























































































the incentive compatibility constraint of the more efficient firm does not 
bind.
Thus the conclusions that firms with higher output hold 
proportionally greater strategic inventories and may serve as swing 
producers follow from these models as well. Proofs of these claims are 
available from the author on request (hand written).
VII CONCLUSION
Supergame theoretic models of asymmetric collusive duopolies 
generate several testable predictions. All result from the fact that it is 
more difficult for a large firm to enforce cooperation by a small firm than 
vice versa. As a result, the larger firm in a collusive duopoly will hold 
larger excess capacity and larger strategic inventories. The large firm may 
also agree to act as a swing producer meeting fluctuations in demand. 
These predictions are supported by qualitative descriptions of successful 
cartels (Eckbo 1976). It would be worthwhile to test them with data on 
large firms in concentrated industries. If the predictions are confirmed the 
use of the models to explain the cyclical behavior of markups and 
inventories will be supported. If the predictions are not confirmed many 
explanations are possible; firms might not be colluding, incentive 
compatibility constraints might not bind or the models and solution 
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